The term "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy" was first used on the world stage by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in August 2016 when he addressed the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Kenya. Now, the United States, too, is advocating the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. Many people presume it to be a new move derived from the ongoing U.S.-China tensions, or even as a geostrategic push to confront Beijing's Belt and Road initiative. Such reactions are off the mark. I will explain why below.
First, "a free and open Indo-Pacific" itself does not represent any strategy. The term strategy means a far-reaching approach and policy initiative to achieve higher-level goals. The free and open Indo-Pacific concept rather depicts an aspiration or vision that transcends many practical policies.
Recently, the Japanese government has reworded the concept it wants to promote, from a free and open Indo-Pacific "strategy" to a free and open Indo-Pacific "vision." Commenting on the change, some people argue that the government has done so to dispel any military connotation that the word strategy might suggest. In my view, "vision" is the right word and should have been used in the first place.
A free and open Indo-Pacific is an absolute must for the existence and development of Japan. In contrast, China, Russia and the United States are likely to manage to continue to exist even if the Indo-Pacific is not a free and open place. So are Britain, France and Germany. But, again, for Japan, it would be a life-or-death situation if we had no free and open waters in the Indo-Pacific.
Needless to say, the Pacific has always been important for the existence and development of Japan. In 1941-45, Japan was at war with the United States for control of the ocean. Japan was defeated. Yet, after the end of the war, it gained freedom in the Pacific by allying with the United States.
For Japan, the shipping route between India and the Middle East became a key maritime passage in the Meiji era (1868-1912). During this era, Japanese merchant ships began making port calls in India and Pakistan, and Japanese trading houses set up footholds there. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902-23 served as leverage for Japan to secure open waters in the Indian Ocean. After the end of World War II, the United States ensured the maintenance of freedom in the Indian Ocean against the backdrop of its own overwhelming power.
Indian Ocean's importance
The Indian Ocean gained in strategic and economic importance during and after the 1990s because India began transforming from a socialist country to open up its markets to foreign investment. Nonetheless, Japan-India relations did not deepen quickly due to India's nuclear tests in 1998, which led to Japan's economic sanctions on that country. In August 2000, when then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited New Delhi, the two countries agreed to set up a bilateral "Group of Eminent Persons" from both sides -- of which I was a member -- to come up with ideas for long-term bilateral cooperation. Subsequently, the sanctions were lifted in 2001.
In 2005, Japan, forming the so-called Group of Four with India, Brazil and Germany, embarked on a campaign seeking to reform the U.N. Security Council. In July of that year, the G4 submitted a draft resolution on Security Council reform. However, the campaign stalled in August of the same year as the G4 draft did not garner enough support from other countries. One noteworthy development in the campaign was a change in Washington's stance regarding Security Council reform -- the United States supported permanent Security Council membership for India, breaking with its past policy of endorsing such status for Japan alone.
Around that time, the number of symposiums and studies involving Japan, India and the United States began increasing, with Australia taking part occasionally. Likewise, there was an increase in the number of articles and research papers published with emphasis on the connectivity of the Indian and Pacific oceans.
In 2008, the Group of Seven major industrialized countries, the European Union and 12 other countries inaugurated the Group of 20 forum. The fact that the 12 countries include Australia, India, Indonesia and South Africa, all of which encircle the Indian Ocean, as well as Saudi Arabia, located close to the ocean, points to the importance of the Indian Ocean in world affairs. The seven other G20 countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Turkey.
Threats from China
In the meantime, threats to a free and open Indo-Pacific have emerged from China. In March 2008, it became known that a senior naval officer of the Chinese People's Liberation Army had proposed that Beijing and Washington share control of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese was quoted as saying: "You take Hawaii east. We'll take Hawaii west."
Further, China, using the so-called Nine Dash Line map, has claimed maritime rights to islands in the South China Sea, the site of territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and other neighboring countries. Beijing has peremptorily conducted land reclamation work and constructed military bases on many of the islands.
In 2013, the Philippines initiated international arbitration proceedings against China's "Nine Dash Line" territorial claim. China refused to participate in the procedure in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. In 2016, the tribunal ruled in favor of Manila, judging that Beijing's claim had no legal basis under international law. For its part, China dismissed the ruling by calling it "nothing more than a piece of paper" and even pressured neighboring countries to side with China. Those neighboring countries that are afraid of China still refrain from referring to the PCA ruling.
Law without force is powerless. The United States is the only country in the world to demonstrate such force to China. However, the U.S. government did not immediately refute the Chinese positions on the two abovementioned cases.
In response to the senior Chinese naval officer, the United States should have immediately and unmistakably said that the Pacific is an area of international waters where freedom must be guaranteed by law and that no countries, including the United States, should have special responsibility for and privileges over the control of the ocean.
As for China's land reclamation work in the South China Sea, the United States should have lodged a protest and denounced the Chinese activity immediately after becoming aware of it. Silence means tacit approval of a country's unacceptable deed. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama boasted about its strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific, but nothing substantial happened.
The current U.S. administration has become increasingly critical of China. President Donald Trump's furiousness with China reminds me of the words of U.S. diplomat George Kennan, known as the architect of Washington's Cold War strategy, that "democracy is peace-loving … [but] fights in anger." The United States had been slow to respond to what China was doing in the western Pacific, but Trump is determinedly confrontational with China.
'Belt and Road' influence
Let's take a look at China's Belt and Road initiative. It is considerably different in nature from the free and open Indo-Pacific vision. The Chinese initiative is a complex of infrastructure construction projects undertaken in neighboring and nearby countries. What is unique to the initiative is China's adherence to its quest for securing greater regional influence.
One of the most notable cases of the increased influence of China has happened in Sri Lanka. The island nation constructed Hambantota Port with Chinese loans, but, when port operations started in 2010, it only incurred losses. As debt repayment was deemed impossible, the country signed a deal in July 2017 to hand over the port to China on a 99-year lease. This is reminiscent of what the Western powers and Japan did in China as they pursued imperial diplomacy. As the deal triggered widespread public and political protests, China eventually compromised to agree to a Sri Lankan government proposal for setting up two companies to share the responsibility for port operations, thus diluting China's dominance of the project.
In a June 2017 speech, Abe expressed Japan's readiness to cooperate with Chinese projects to be undertaken under the Belt and Road initiative under a few conditions. He said, "First of all, it is critical for infrastructure to be open to use by all, and to be developed through procurement that is transparent and fair … [and it is] essential for projects to be economically viable and to be financed by debt that can be repaid, and not to harm the soundness of the debtor nation's finances."
On top of such conditions, I would like to add one more condition: Belt and Road projects should give consideration to natural and social environmental aspects and that the criteria for project eligibility be defined by the G20 forum. Since the autumn of 2017, I have been making such a suggestion to a variety of government, business and thought leaders in Japan and abroad. They have favorably reacted to my suggestion. Given that China takes pride in being a civilized power, I do not think the country's leadership has any reason to oppose my suggestion.
During his visit to Beijing in October, Abe offered to enhance cooperation with China in line with the conditions he spelled out in 2017. There are some people who suggest that Japan should not approach China when Washington is at loggerheads with Beijing. But my suggestion aims to detoxify China's Belt and Road initiative. Japan should avoid clashing with China, one of its neighboring countries, while committing itself to being supportive of the independence and development of China's neighboring and nearby countries -- none of which want to become a satellite state of any other country. Currently, Japan and China are discussing the possibility of cooperating with each other in promoting several infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. It is advisable for them to expand their cooperation in other regions, including Africa, where they may be able to collaborate in U.N. peacekeeping operations, for example.
The U.S.-China tensions are expected to endure for a certain period of time and it is a matter of course for Japan to take the U.S. side. Nonetheless, it is also important to wait for a change in China's attitudes while continuing cooperation with it, however limited, with a view to detoxifying Chinese diplomacy.
Special to The Yomiuri Shimbun
Kitaoka is a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, specializing in Japanese political and diplomatic history. He is also president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, a post he assumed in October 2015 after serving as president of the International University of Japan. He was Japan's ambassador to the United Nations in 2004-06. He serves or has served on a variety of government panels, including as chair of the council set up by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in August 2018 to establish a "Long-Term Growth Strategy under the Paris Agreement," and deputy chair of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security in 2013-14.
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