The attention of Brexit-watchers has understandably been focused on Boris Johnson’s disastrous week in parliament and the exact timing of any election. But key to what happens next is, of course, the EU’s position.
When UK (and European) commentators talk about the EU’s stance on Brexit, they almost invariably conclude that “nothing has changed”. Europe’s unity is paramount. Ireland will not be sacrificed. The withdrawal agreement will not be reopened. Even suggesting that Germany’s deteriorating economic conditions may give Berlin some pause for thought is tantamount to heresy. The EU’s Brexit position is fixed in time and space.
The truth, as always, is more nuanced, as I learned during meetings in Brussels at the end of last week. There is real debate in the EU about Brexit. The EU’s position today is subtly different to that of two weeks ago. And its position of two weeks ago subtly different to that which came before. So where is the EU currently on Brexit?
The EU liked Olly Robbins, Theresa May’s Brexit negotiator. Intelligent, thoughtful, persistent and tirelessly hardworking, he was widely respected among his EU peers as someone they could do business with. They were less keen on May herself. Their misgivings were well-founded. Robbins negotiated a Brexit deal widely recognised in Europe as an excellent outcome for the UK, in light of the red lines his prime minister had drawn at the time. Yet May proved incapable of managing the domestic politics and selling his deal. This provides the context for understanding how the EU sees Johnson.
While there is a lot in him they dislike, they welcomed the fact he is a “red-blooded politician”, as one adviser to an EU head of state put it to me. A breath of fresh air compared to May. The fact Brexit is inherently political for Johnson – a means to a bigger Commons majority – creates the glimmer, no matter how slight, that he may be able to get a deal over the line. This, combined with Johnson’s singular focus on the backstop, and his willingness to adopt “a continental line” on global issues at the G7 in Biarritz, gave EU leaders more confidence a deal could possibly be struck.
This was partly why the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, signalled a willingness to explore changes to the backstop, insofar as any new UK proposals protect the Irish peace process and the EU’s single market.
This view still holds – just – despite the events of the last few weeks. But it’s equally fair to say that the goodwill Johnson did establish is quickly ebbing. But this is not for the reasons people might think.
It is true that the government has not tabled any formal proposals to the EU yet. This reinforces scepticism in Westminster that the government is serious about a deal. However, senior EU officials and negotiators were not expecting much prior to the Tory party conference, which runs from 29 September to 2 October. The critical window they have earmarked were the weeks running into the 17-18 October European heads of state meeting in Brussels, and after, until 31 October.
Moreover, trial balloons floated by No 10 have made their way to the EU’s institutions and have been discussed by the 27 member states. These include radically reducing the backstop to sectoral elements and proposing a single all-Ireland regime for agriculture.
David Frost, Johnson’s most senior official for European affairs and the government’s lead negotiator, has also clarified the government’s approach to Brexit, clearly setting out new parameters for the negotiation. Unlike Robbins and May, the Johnson government is not seeking “frictionless trade” with the EU while simultaneously leaving the EU’s two economic institutions that are necessary to deliver it – the customs union and the single market. Instead, Johnson and Frost only want to “facilitate” trade with the EU. They accept that Brexit will mean the UK’s access to EU markets will suffer.
This is where Europe’s concerns set in. The ideas floated by No 10 suggest a trade border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. As one senior EU negotiator puts it: “The backstop means no border on the island of Ireland. But the UK’s solution will result in a customs and regulatory border – which will carry implications for peace.” This is obviously unacceptable for the EU27.
The government also wants to bank the benefits of Brexit by diverging from EU rules to the maximum extent possible. Yet this has fostered the perception in EU capitals that the UK will compete with its firms by undercutting EU standards.
Politically, it makes little strategic sense for the EU to compromise on the backstop – and risk its principles – if the purpose of doing so is to facilitate a deal over a bare-bones free trade agreement (FTA) that would not differ much from a no-deal outcome. “What’s the difference between no deal and a hard FTA?” ponders another adviser to an EU head of state. In no deal, the EU would at least have stuck to its principles.
Once the EU factors in Johnson’s tumultuous week in parliament – that has left him heading an even weaker minority government and facing the high likelihood of an early election – it’s possible to see why its calculus is shifting it again towards a harder, less flexible position.
As the UK slides painfully towards an early election, there is less scope for progress in Brussels. Any formal UK proposals will become political fodder. The EU will have to become more cautious in its response; it will not risk its interventions becoming part of the campaign. As the EU ponders events in London, its window for a deal, while open, is closing.
• Mujtaba Rahman is the managing director of Europe at Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm
