Even though it's mostly still speculation, the idea that the military regime may form a political party has ignited a huge debate.
The rumours gained strength after Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon, while answering reporters' questions, did not rule it out as a possible option.
The journalists kept pressing Gen Prawit, the de facto "big brother" of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), after a report emerged that a retired general who formerly worked for the NCPO was preparing to form a party, the support of which would enable the regime to maintain its power beyond the general election expected next November.
Soonruth Bunyamanee is Deputy Editor, Bangkok Post.
As expected, Gen Prawit opted to hedge his bets. He said: "The NCPO will not be involved in politics. But if it is necessary, it [a political party] will be set up."
What is striking is that this is the first time the junta has talked about the possibility of such a move.
I personally welcome such openness and debate in the political sphere. It is good for the political system, and such a development would cast members of the regime in the light of legitimate political players, rather than as dictators who use firearms to rob people of democracy.
Nonetheless, some may argue the regime does not necessarily need to form a political party of its own to maintain its grip on Thai politics.
Under the military-sponsored constitution, there exists a sure-fire mechanism that enables the junta to stay in power after next year's poll.
The charter mandates that 250 appointed senators will serve five-year terms during a transitional post-election period. Almost all of them will be handpicked by the NCPO. Six of the seats are reserved for the chiefs of the three armed forces along with the head of the Supreme Command, the defence permanent secretary and the national police chief.
The six top brass are expected to represent the NCPO, meaning it will still cast a long shadow over the appointed Senate.
Moreover, the charter makes it possible for an "outsider" prime minister to take over, meaning one who is elected by the Thai parliament rather than the public.
With the 250-strong Senate effectively under the NCPO's control, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha clearly has a strong chance of being nominated.
That may explain why Gen Prayut has repeatedly insisted he is not interested in running for office yet has never denied the possibility of there being an "outsider" premier.
The charter also makes provisions to ensure the regime's 20-year national strategy and national reform plans are carried out, which could stymie or limit the functions and power of political parties and future governments.
Organic laws under the charter have also been designed in such a way that will drastically change Thai politics. As a result, there will be almost zero chance of a big party winning a majority vote and having the power to form a decisive government.
Under such circumstances, medium-sized parties will be granted more bargaining power and will play a much bigger role in determining who can form a government.
Given all of these provisions, many believe there is no need for the junta to form a party as surely it would be more convenient for it to use existing political parties as proxies to do its bidding.
So why would Gen Prawit entertain, or at least not rule out, the idea of the NCPO setting up its own political party?
First, it would be useful if the junta failed to reach agreement with, and gain the support of, existing parties. Second, if the regime were to lose popularity or feel it cannot trust any of the parties, it would require its own "vehicle".
And there are indicators the regime may be in decline.
The latest opinion survey by Super Poll, conducted Nov 3-4 on 1,109 people, showed a substantial drop in support for Gen Prayut, slipping from 78.4% in July to 52% in the space of four months.
The survey has irritated several junta leaders, including Gen Prawit, who has questioned the way in which the poll was conducted. He also insisted Gen Prayut has been overworked and that the situation has improved recently.
Regardless, the regime's dwindling popularity -- which derives mostly from the people around Gen Prayut rather than the premier himself -- has undermined its negotiating power.
After three years of running the country, the Prayut administration can boast of significant progress in curbing corruption in state agencies, but a number of scandals have made the public suspicious of just how transparent it is.
One case saw the regime let a private company lease public land despite local opposition. Another involved a proposal to buy overpriced speed guns. Then there was the idea of buying expensive retina scanners, the procurement of huge servers, an amendment of a law that allegedly favours seed firms over farmers, and of course the welfare card project that allegedly benefited business giants at the expense of the poor.
The government has also taken flak for huge increases in military spending.
And it has failed to transfer the benefits of macroeconomic recovery to medium- and low-income people, and failed to tackle falling agricultural prices.
Cronyism is another concern Gen Prayut does not appear to have taken action on.
In fact, many people who used to support the Prayut government have turned into vocal critics.
Rubber planters in the South are a case in point, led by Suthep Thaugsuban, a former deputy prime minister. He supported Gen Prayut at the time of the 2014 coup but is now heaping pressure on the regime after a steep plunge in rubber prices.
The regime still has a year to shore up its popularity, but this would require more transparency and the jettisoning of dubious projects and proposals. A non-partisan approach to the cabinet reshuffle would also be well-received.
Clarifying its political stance may also win back some fans.
