There is an interesting report in today's New York Times on the extent of German involvement in the Iraq war. Among the major players on the international stage, the run-up to the war and the invasion have tended to be portrayed as a time of concrete certainties and irreconcilable dichotomies, splitting new Europe off from old and pitting the consumers of freedom fries against cheese eating surrender monkeys.
What the report suggests is that there were rather more shades of grey than this black and white version of events would suggest. Based on US military documents, it claims German intelligence passed Iraqi plans for the defence of Baghdad to the US while the Berlin government was publically opposed to it.
A Pentagon official also reveals that the US military had Germany on its list of "non-coalition but cooperating" nations. Others, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were marked down as "silent partners" for allowing the US to use their territory for refueling or launching clandestine operations. Germany also provided support to US military bases on its own soil - freeing up more US personnel - and patrolled sea lanes off the Horn of Africa.
In certain hands, it is the kind of information that could be used to rewrite history to the effect that there was wide support for the war, that the "coalition of the willing" was more than the US, Britain and several smaller nations including the likes of Mongolia.
More accurately, while the divisions were real, the strength of oppostion was not uniform. A 25,000 word Vanity Fair investigation in May 2004 revealed that Jacques Chirac's top adviser, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, told Condoleezza Rice in January 2003 that an open breach could be avoided as long as the US did not try to force tensions out with a bid for a second UN resolution before it went to war. The diplomatic effort for further UN cover was largely to give Tony Blair greater leverage within parliament.
Why the splits continued after the fall of Baghdad probably had something to do with domestic politics. Frostiness from Gerhard Schröder towards George Bush would have played to the German chancellor's advantage with a largely anti-war electorate, while the US Republican party did not shy away from idenitifying John Kerry in the 2004 presidential campaign as somehow French.
There were also incidences of pure dislike. Relations between Blair and Schröder, once seen as champions of the third way, never recovered. Blair and Chirac have fallen out at almost every opportunity since - which the French president's explanation of in terms of a relationship of amour violent never did fully explain.
As for the Iraqi battle plans, the US learned from Germany that the previous strategy of trying to bloody an invading army on the road to Baghdad was rejected by Saddam in December 2002 in favour of four defensive rings around the capital. The New York Times report adds that it was opposed by the Iraqi general with responsibly for guarding the southern approach, but he was told by Qusay Hussein that his father had approved it and it was him who would make the plan work. He did not.
