The Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc), the state's national security apparatus, is once again in the media spotlight, mired in reputational fallout. This time, former House Speaker Wan Muhamad Noor Matha suggested in parliament that Isoc should be abolished because its duties overlap with those of other agencies and its work does not justify its enormous budget. His suggestion was dismissed outright by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, who insisted that Isoc is a permanent fixture of the country.
Mr Wan is not the first critic of the security agency. Human rights advocates and political activists have long called on successive governments to disband it or, at the very least, undertake root-and-branch reform. Their concerns should not go unheeded. Isoc's track record is troubling, inspiring fear more often than the sense of security it was created to provide.
In March, Prachachart MP Kamolsak Leewamoh of Narathiwat survived an attack by gunmen, although two of his assistants were injured. Police later found that vehicles and weapons used in the assassination attempt belonged to Isoc. Last month, the Appeal Court found that Isoc had conducted information operations against two human rights defenders. Meanwhile, as revealed during the parliamentary budget debate, Isoc launched 140 campaigns targeting opposing or dissenting groups over three fiscal years.
Founded in the 1960s to counter the communist insurgency, Isoc has evolved into a quasi-omnipotent security body with cross-agency powers and an enormous budget. Beyond its national security role, the Prayut government assigned Isoc a range of civilian responsibilities, including disaster response and promoting public awareness of the duty to protect the nation, religion and monarchy. The problem is that there is no systematic mechanism to account for how Isoc spends its funds or how many people are actually on its payroll.
A 2019 budget document showed Isoc was allocated 10.2 billion baht to support 5,000-6,000 staff nationwide (excluding the South), along with 500,000-600,000 internal security volunteers and tens of thousands more in its information network. It would not be surprising if Isoc's budget has since grown even larger. Reports indicate that since 2004, at least 500 billion baht has been approved to fund Isoc's special missions addressing violence in the deep South. That figure excludes salaries, per diem payments and additional allowances for thousands of Isoc personnel.
There have also been reports that soldiers and police officers are transferred to Isoc's southern offices to receive additional positions and allowances without actually relocating. Despite such concerns, Mr Anutin says Thailand cannot do without Isoc. Can it? Indeed, many of Isoc's responsibilities overlap with those of the Interior Ministry, the police, the army, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, and local administrations. Isoc describes itself as the "linking hinge" among state agencies. If that is the case, why does it need thousands of staff on its payroll?
If Mr Anutin wants Isoc to remain, he must make it a better institution. He should begin by ending mission creep, including information operations against critics and political activists. The government must also subject Isoc's budget, operations and staffing to independent scrutiny, cut excess positions and improve accountability. Preserving Isoc is not an end in itself. The agency must remain open to reform and scrutiny.
