The South Yorkshire police commander in charge when 96 people died at Hillsborough has concluded his evidence to the new inquests into the disaster by admitting he was preoccupied on the day with preventing crowd disorder, and never considered the possibility of people dying by crushing.
In the briefing he gave to officers before the FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest on 15 April 1989, the then chief superintendent, David Duckenfield, stressed the need to maintain segregation between the two clubs’ supporters and prevent fighting.
Questioned by his own barrister, John Beggs QC, on the morning of his seventh day in the witness box at the inquests in Warrington, Duckenfield agreed that his “main focus” was maintaining segregation.
Beggs asked him whether he had contemplated crushing as a potential crisis on the day. “No, sir,” Duckenfield replied.
Duckenfield also said he “could not be certain” his evidence was correct last week when he said he recognised at 3.04pm, when he saw a man collapse on the pitch, that what was unfolding was a medical emergency not a pitch invasion. The police radio log shows that Duckenfield ordered dog handlers to come to Hillsborough after that. He accepted that he was still regarding what was happening as a pitch invasion until his superintendent, Bernard Murray, requested a fleet of ambulances, at 3.08pm.
He agreed, as he has said previously in his questioning by barristers including those representing the families of the 96 people who died, that as the match commander on the day, “the buck stops with me”.
However, Duckenfield did agree with Beggs that he had been inexperienced, having only been promoted to chief superintendent and Hillsborough match commander 19 days before the semi-final where he would be responsible for the safety of 54,000 spectators. He said that before the match, no other officers warned him about safety concerns at Hillsborough, including the “Freeman tactic” of closing off the tunnel leading to the pens of the Leppings Lane terrace when theywere full.
Duckenfield admitted in his previous day’s evidence that he “froze” when asked to order a large exit gate open to allow lots of supporters in at once to alleviate serious congestion outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles. He admitted it was a “serious mistake” not to foresee that they would go down the tunnel which faced them as they came through the gate, so he did not take steps to close the tunnel. Duckenfield admitted that those failures directly caused the 96 deaths.
Questioned by Beggs, Duckenfield said that none of the other four officers in the police control room at Hillsborough, including Murray – an experienced ground commander – advised him there would be problems getting all the fans in by the 3pm kick-off, that the pens were overcrowded, or that the tunnel should be closed when the gates were opened.
Duckenfield confirmed that his evidence to the jury of seven women and three men and the coroner, Sir John Goldring, has been that he committed “some very serious professional failures”. But he said these were in the context of him being new, working to an order he inherited from the previous year’s semi-final and the previous chief superintendent, Brian Mole, and being under intense pressure from 2.30pm as the congestion outside Leppings Lane built up.
He also said he was not responsible for the poor signage at Sheffield Wednesday’s ground, the installation of fences, its architecture or the ground’s breaches of the official “green guide” to stadium safety, which the inquests heard about last year.
“On the morning of 15 April 1989,” Beggs asked him, “was the very last outcome you envisaged or wished for the death or injury to a single football supporter in those central pens?”
“I didn’t want that at all, sir,” Duckenfield replied.
As he left the court, Duckenfield was stopped by Barry Devonside, whose son Christopher, then 18, died in the terrible crush in those overcrowded pens. Duckenfield told Devonside he could not comment.
The inquests continue.
