Here is a link to our latest news story on day eight of the inquiry:
Updated
Summary
Here is a summary of the eighth day of the inquiry, which saw the opening statement by Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry and the release of five key expert reports:
- An expert concluded there was a “culture of non-compliance” at Grenfell Tower, the inquiry has heard. Dr Barbara Lane’s report, one of five adduced to the inquiry today, said there were more than 100 non-compliant fire doors, a firefighting lift that didn’t work and that the cladding system was “substantially to blame for the tragedy”
- The fire service’s “stay put” strategy was said to have failed by just over half an hour after the 999 call yet remained in place for a further hour and seven minutes. Lane said the strategy was not supported by the cladding system, which created a “disproportionately high probability of fire spread”
- Only 36 people managed to escape from the building after safety advice given by the London Fire Brigade to stay put was abandoned at 2.47am, the inquiry heard. Millet said 187 people escaped before it was changed and the inquiry would examine whether the maintenance of the advice “made all the difference between life and death”.
- A number of materials used in the 2016 refurbishment of the tower were combustible, the inquiry heard. Giving the opening statement, Richard Millet QC identified combustible materials in a number of areas, including the windows, cladding and kitchen vents.
- Other issues identified include the water supply, namely the absence of a wet - as opposed to a dry - riser main and the operation of the smoke ventilation system.
- The inquiry heard the initial 999 call by Bahailu Kebede, who lived in flat 16, in which he said: “It’s [on the ] fourth floor, quick, quick, quick, it’s burning.” Three fire engines were dispatched at 0054, another was dispatched five minutes later and they began tackling the fire at 0118. Millet says initial fire grew hot enough to escape flat 16 possibly through growing hot enough to deform the UPVC (plastic) windows before igniting the facade windows.
- “Truly shocking” video footage was shown of the rapid spread of the fire. Observers could be heard shouting at people to get out, sobbing and screaming. The chair of the inquiry, Martin Moore-Blick said he had seen aspects of the footage many times but it remained “truly shocking”.
Richard Millet warns core participants that they should refrain from “a merry-go-round of buck passing” in relation to their role in what experts have preliminarily identified as the “hazardous” state of Grenfell Tower, when they are asked to give evidence.
He reminds core participants that they can be compelled to attend the inquiry.
That concludes Millet’s opening statement and the eighth day of the inquiry. It will resume at 10am tomorrow with the opening statement on behalf of the Met police.
Millett is talking more about the stay put advice and says they will be examining why some people ignored it. To that end, transcripts of a number of 999 calls have been released, he says.
Millet says that 144 people left the building before 1.38am but only 36 after the stay put guidance was changed at 2.47am.
It may be that the formal maintenance of that [stay put] advice until 2.47am made all the difference between life and death.
Updated
The counsel to the inquiry says it will investigate the means of communicating with residents, particularly when the stay put policy was abandoned at 2.47am. Which communication methods were available and which were used?
More than 250 witness statements have been disclosed to core participants from London Fire Brigade firefighters out of 615 disclosed by police.
Repeating what he said earlier, Millet says 52 will give aural evidence and more will be read into evidence. He reads a quote from LFB commissioner Dany Cotton’s evidence:
I have never seen a building where the whole of it was on fire. It was so alien to anything I have ever seen.
Millett says that Cotton’s words reflect the experience of all firefighters on duty that night.
He says the inquiry will examine the decisions made by the commissioners, what was the basis for them, whether any alternatives presented themselves and if not, why not.
There are eight basic questions for them, says Millet:
1. What was the policy for assessing the materials and construction of high-rise buildings?
2. Was that policy applied at Grenfell Tower?
3. What was the policy where compartmentation failed?
4. When did it become obvious compartmentation had failed?
5. What change did they make to their strategy as a result?
6. Why was “stay and put” revoked at 2.47am and not earlier?
7. What difference did that revocation make given the volume of evacuation before then?
8. How did it get communicated to residents when revoked.
Millett says below level 18 the majority of bodies were found on the floor where they resided, but above level 18 many were found on higher floors, many on floor 23. No bodies were found in flats in the north-east corner of the building.
The lobbies and stairs at particular times may have become “particularly affected by heat and smoke”.
Some parts were described as becoming “boiling hot”.
Millett says the inquiry will be exploring whether any failure of compartmentation within the building was through failures of physical features including fire doors and/or the actions of the firefighters.
He refers to the ongoing investigation by the police watchdog into the use of helicopters during the fire and whether it might have encouraged people stay put to move to the top of the tower towards the roof and/or worsened the fire.
Updated
Richard Millett QC says Dr Lane’s report has highlighted a number of matters for concern, including
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the flats’ front doors and whether the self-closing devices were properly installed and maintained.
- he goes on to the failure of the firefighting lift to perform, suggesting it did not operate how the fire brigade expected it to do so.
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Water supply and whether a wet riser main should have been provided as well as a dry riser main. A water expert has been appointed to advise on water supply systems with respect to whether there was adequate water pressure.
- There are questions over the smoke ventilation system and whether it operated as intended, says Millett adding that there is evidence that it did not.
Other issues that need to be examined he says are the fire stair doors, how resistant they may have been and whether they were held open e.g. by firefighting hoses, or did not shut as intended.
The performance of the single staircase itself, whether it was sufficient will also be analysed.
The supply of gas is another issue and whether the piping was compromised.
Richard Millet QC moves on to the cause and origin of the fire, which he says is believed to be accidental. He says they are still awaiting forensic evidence.
He says
The inquiry’s experts have identified a range of mechanisms which may have affected the fire spread on the night.
Professor Jose Torero’s expert report for the inquiry suggests that, according to the first law of physics, any domestic fire would have spread via the UPVC windows and into the cladding.
Dr Lane identified six different pathways of the fire, says Millet.
The counsel to the inquiry says:
What is abundantly clear is that the building envelope created an intolerable fire hazard.
He continues:
The building was designed and maintained in the expectation that nothing but a single apartment fire would occur.
Millett says at 1.13am the London Fire Brigade (LFB), namely Mike Dowden, made the first request for a hydraulic platform and asked for another two fire engines (from four to six).
At 1.14am an aerial appliance was asked for.
By 1.15am a hose stream was being applied to the eastern facade.
At 1.19am another two fire engines were requested.
At 1.20am the firefighters are believed to have first entered the kitchen of flat 16.
At 1.24am the LFB called for 10 fire engines.
By 1.26 am the fire had “spread vertically” about 50metres. About 20 flats were exposed to the flame front by this point.
At 1.27am the number of fire engines requested was increased to 15 plus two aerial appliances.
By 1.29am the fire had reached the top floor of the east facade and simultaneously LFB called to “make pumps [number of fire engines] 20”
1.31am the LFB called for 25 fire engines.
At 2.04am LFB called for 40 fire engines plus four aerial appliances. Millett says “a 40 pump fire is a very rare occurence”.
A major incident was called at 2.06am.
By 2.10am 34 flats were believed to have been exposed to the flame front.
By 2.23 some 53 flats were believed to have been exposed to the flame front.
By 2.30 the whole of the east facade was believed to be “involved”.
At 2.47pm the stay put guidance was changed, 187 occupants had evacuated by this point, leaving some 107 still within the building at that point.
By 3.08am the fire was spreading laterally across the west facade and a minute later some 70 flats had been exposed.
Soon large parts of the south face were alight.
4.03am two flame fronts wrapping round the corner had converged round flat 23 at the south-west corner of the building and 98 flats were exposed.
At 4.47am a person believed to be the third last evacuee left the building.
6.05am the second last survivor evacuated.
8.07am the last occupant evacuated
At 7.55pm on 14 June, Asst Commissioner Graham Ellis declared there was no longer any saveable life within the building.
Updated
Proceedings resume with the counsel to the inquiry, Richard Millett QC, warning that the chronology of events he is to commence will feature still photographs of the building on fire which could cause distress.
In her report, Prof Niamh Daeid says external fire hoses were also used to tackle the fire in Flat 16. Footage from a video flat 16 resident Bahailu Kebede took from outside the building, once he had left his flat, showed the extractor fan in his kitchen window, on fire.
Fire investigators, attending in the aftermath of the blaze that engulfed Grenfell Tower, subsequently entered flat 16. At this point the fire scene investigation was focused primarily on the area of the kitchen that contained the window and the tall fridge freezer, the report states.
Other electrical items in the kitchen, including a a hot plate and old freezer and a small fridge, none of which were believed to have been plugged in at the time, were taken away for examination, as was the tall fridge freezer. There were other items between the tall fridge freezer and the wall, which have not yet been identified, the report states.
The fact that laminate flooring from underneath the tall fridge freezer revealed a burn pattern that was not present on the surrounding area indicated it was likely the fire started in this area. There was melting on the socket on the wall next to the tall fridge freezer and burning to the nearby skirting board. There were no traces of any external accelerant, such as petrol.
She states that further electrical examination undertaken by a forensic electrical engineer is required of the materials recovered from flat 16. It was also necessary to identify the materials which were being stored between the tall fridge freezer and the window, which have not been identified. She says:
Once the identity of the materials in the space between the tall fridge freezer and the window are known and the findings of the electrical examination are available, these will be further considered and this report will be updated and opinions relating to the area of origin of the fire may change accordingly.
Summary
Here is a summary of the main developments this morning. The inquiry will resume at 2pm.
- An expert concluded there was a “culture of non-compliance” at Grenfell Tower, the inquiry has heard. Dr Barbara Lane’s report, one of five adduced to the inquiry today, said there were more than 100 non-compliant fire doors, a firefighting lift that didn’t work and that the cladding system was “substantially to blame for the tragedy”
- The fire service’s “stay put” strategy was said to have failed by just over half an hour after the 999 call yet remained in place for a further hour and seven minutes. Lane said the strategy was not supported by the cladding system, which created a “disproportionately high probability of fire spread”
- A number of materials used in the 2016 refurbishment of the tower were combustible, the inquiry heard. Giving the opening statement, Richard Millet QC identified combustible materials in a number of areas, including the windows, cladding and kitchen vents.
- The inquiry heard the initial 999 call by Bahailu Kebede, who lived in flat 16, in which he said: “It’s [on the ] fourth floor, quick, quick, quick, it’s burning.” Three fire engines were dispatched at 0054, another was dispatched five minutes later and they began tackling the fire at 0118. Millet says initial fire grew hot enough to escape flat 16 possibly through growing hot enough to deform the UPVC (plastic) windows before igniting the facade windows.
- “Truly shocking” video footage was shown of the rapid spread of the fire. Observers could be heard shouting at people to get out, sobbing and screaming. The chair of the inquiry, Martin Moore-Blick said he had seen aspects of the footage many times but it remained “truly shocking”.
Updated
Dr Lane also wrote in her expert report that firefighters may have contributed to the spread of fire and smoke into the stairwell by leaving doors ajar as they fought the blaze:
I have identified the fact that the firefighting operations in response to the multi-storey fire may have contributed to the failure of the stair fire doors to prevent fire and smoke spread.
Current evidence indicates some of the stair doors were ajar as firefighting hoses were running from the stair into the lobby. However, I currently do not know the number of doors involved, nor which specific doors, nor for how long this opening may have occurred. I cannot yet conclude whether this made a significant contribution.
The video of the spread of the fire is still being shown at the inquiry. We hear other people outside the tower observing as the fire spreads.
One young man says: “That’s in my yard ...My dad’s still inside.”
Another says: “People are going to die and I’m scared.”
A young woman/girl can be heard sobbing.
One can only imagine the trauma from watching the fire engulf the tower.
The video concludes:
The chair of the inquiry, Martin Moore-Blick, says:
I’ve seen that footage of parts of it many times... but it’s truly shocking.
The inquiry will now break for prayers and lunch.
A video is shown of the early development of the fire and its vertical spread on the east face of the tower. It opens with the 999 call by Bahailu Kebede, who lived in flat 16. He says “The fire’s [in] flat 16, Grenfell Tower” and gives his postcode when prompted, urging them to be quick.
It’s [on the ] fourth floor, quick, quick, quick, it’s burning.
He confirms to the operator that he is outside.
The images of the video show the fire starting very small and then spreading along the side of the tower. It is chilling to see how a fire which initially looked so innocuous spread so rapidly and massively.
At one point, a woman’s voice can be heard shouting: “Get out of the tower.”
Richard Millet says three fire engines were initially dispatched at 0054 from following the call from Bahailu Kebede, who lived in flat 16.
A fourth fire engine was sent five minutes later because it was a “high-rise incident”.
The first fire engine arrived at 0107.
Millet says initial fire grew hot enough to escape flat 16 possibly through growing hot enough to deform the UPVC (plastic) windows before igniting the facade windows.
Firefighters began tackling the fire at 0118, he says. By then, says Millett, the fire had probably already caught hold of the external cladding, as evidenced by melting and dripping. He shows photographs.
The initial response to the 999 call to the fire in flat 16 was outlined in Prof Niamh Daeid’s report to the inquiry.
London Fire Brigade sent four fire engines in their initial response to flat 16 occupier Behailu Kebede’s call, the report said, drawing on the fire fighters notes, witness statements and images taken at the scene.
The first two fire fighters to enter the flat broke down the door and described how “black smoke billowed out”. They checked the bedrooms and opened a door which led to the living room and noted there was was “no sign of fire” , the report states.
The fire appeared to be in the top left corner of the kitchen. It was described by one as “an isolated curtain of flame from about 2-3 feet in the air to the ceiling”.
Images captured by their thermal imaging camera suggest that the hot fire gases and flames had spread across the window space by the time the fire fighters had opened the kitchen door for the first time.
Increased temperatures were indicated above the tall fridge freezer and to the immediate left had side where the window is located. The thermal images also recorded what appears to be falling embers outside the window. The images also appear to show that the fire may have breached through the sliding doors between the kitchen and living room.
A second fire crew carried out a thorough search of the bedrooms, bathroom and living room, before taking over the fire fighting activities in the kitchen . The report said that one, John O’Hanlon, stated he observed of the fridge.
You wouldn’t recognise it as a fridge, just a charred rectangle with a bit of melted stuff at the bottom that was still alight. The flame was around 30 cm high ...
The window had gone by then, broken....that’s when we noticed the window had completely gone. Even the frame wasn’t there and and we noticed that it was on fire, that the window surround was on fire.”
We walked over to the window and started spraying the window frame. It’s didn’t have any effect on it, at which point I sat on the window sill and was leaning out and trying to hit what I thought was the window surround.
When they left, fire fighter Nicholas Barton stated “the condition of flat 16 from what I remember as we left it, it was smoke damaged throughout the flat, but only appeared to be fire damage in the kitchen where the flames had been”.
Daeid’s report states:
In total, the time between the first opening of the door of flat 16 and the final entry into the kitchen which resulted in extinguishing the fire within the kitchen was estimated to be 11 minutes 35 seconds.
In her expert report, Dr Lane condemned a “culture of non-compliance” at Grenfell Tower. She wrote:
The number of non-compliances signify a culture of non-compliance at Grenfell Tower. I am particularly concerned about the maintenance regime of the active and passive fire protection measures.
I note that multiple automatic systems such as the control of the fire life and the smoke ventilation system, appear not to have operated as required.
Fire doors 'contributed significantly to spread of fire'
Dr Lane wrote in her report that poorly performing fire doors “contributed significantly to the spread of smoke and fire to the lobbies” and would have “materially affected the ability or willingness of occupants to escape independently through this space to the stair”.
In 2011, the Tenant Management Organisation - which ran the building - replaced 106 flat entrance fire doors. None of the doors on any of the 120 flats - including the 14 not replaced - were compliant with the fire test evidence relied upon at the time of installation, Dr Lane found.
Another failure of an “unknown number of doors” to self-close after an occupant escaped would have allowed “immediate” spread of fire and smoke.
The lobbies could therefore not be used as a “safe air environment” by the fire service bridgehead, forcing it to remain below level 4 until 7.30am.
She wrote:
This greatly reduced the time available using breathing apparatus, and so the time available for rescue on the upper floors, and particularly above Level 15.
Additionally, the firefighting lift did not work because the firefighting “switch” function - A kind of override allowing firefighters to use the lift to access - failed. This meant firefighters had to walk up and down 23 storeys.
Richard Millett QC warns those in the room at the inquiry that he will shortly be showing a 12-minute video including images of Grenfell Tower on fire as well as still photographs that some people may feel distressing. There will be a short break to allow people who wish to do so to leave the room.
Although the fire is thought to have originated in or near the fridge freezer in flat 16 on the fourth floor , there was insufficient information and analysis available to determine the cause of the fire, the inquiry has been told.
“As a consequence, the cause of the fire remains undetermined at this point,” the report by Prof Niamh Daeid, director of the Liverhulme Research Centre for Forensic Science at Dundee University, stated. She is a former chair of the fire and explosives working party of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, and vice chair of the Scientific Advisory Board for the International Criminal Court.
Her provisional report, dated March 2018. contained details of the first call which was made by Behailu Kebede, who lived in flat 16 with two others, to London Fire Brigade at 00.54.29.
Mr Bahailu Kebede states in his witness statement that he was wakened at around 00.55 by the sound of a smoke alarm which he believed was in the kitchen of his flat (flat 16 on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower). He went into the kitchen and saw smoke in the area of the fridge/freezer and the kitchen window. He woke the other occupants of the flat and phoned the fire brigade using his mobile phone and alerted the other residents living in the various flats on floor 4 of Grenfell Tower.
Kebede had said in his statement, that he switched off the electricity supply to flat 16 at the fuse box as he left the flat.
Millet says it is Dr Lane’s preliminary opinion that the fire “rapidly became unprecedented”, becoming a major fire on multiple storeys. She is quoted:
The active and passive fire protection measures within Grenfell Tower were required to mitigate an extraordinary event and as a result the consequences were catastrophic.
He says the fire is believed to have started in flat 16.
The council to the inquiry says the new windows installed on every floor between 2012 and 2016 were moved outwards so they sat flush with the new cladding system.
Gaps were covered in combustible plastic. New kitchen vent panels were also combustible.
Richard Millet QC is talking about the 2016 refurbishment which saw aluminium composite panels installed on the face of the building.
He says that the cladding manufacturer Arconic accepted that it “was not of limited combustibility ...and [that] should have been obvious to any construction professional”.
Arconic discontinued Reynobond PE panels that were combined with insulation to form cladding, after the cladding was revealed as flammable in the wake of the Grenfell Tower blaze.
Updated
Cladding contributed to "most rapid of external fire spread'
In her expert report, Dr Barbara Lane found “no evidence” that some of the key bodies involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower understood how the cladding system would behave in a fire.
She also did not find evidence that the London Fire Brigade assessment recorded the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding.
Lane wrote that the Reynobond 55PE rainscreen cladding “contributed to the most rapid of the external fire spread”.
Her report added:
The windows were not provided with fire resisting cavity barriers. These unprotected openings themselves were surrounded by combustible material.
Additional combustible construction materials were located in the room on the ceiling beside the window.
Therefore, in the event of any fire starting near a window, there was a disproportionately high probability of fire spread into rainscreen cladding system.
Fire service's stay put strategy 'failed'
Dr Barbara Lane, an expert commissioned by the inquiry to analyse the blaze, said, in one of five expert reports released today that the cladding system gave a “disproportionately high probability of fire spread” so that the fire service’s “stay put” advice was not supported. She wrote
I conclude that the entire system could not adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls having regard to height, use and position of the building.
Specifically, the assembly failed adequately to resist the spread of fire to an extent that supported the required Stay Put strategy for this high-rise residential building.
There were multiple catastrophic fire-spread routes created by the construction form and construction detailing.
She wrote that the “stay put” strategy pursued by the fire service had “effectively failed” barely half an hour after the fire started, at 1.26am.
At present I am unclear about the basis for delaying the formal end of the Stay Put strategy between 1.40am and 2.47am.
I am particularly concerned by the delay from 2.06am, when a major incident was declared, to 2.47am.
A list of issues on which the inquiry will focus has just been published on the inquiry website (in pdf format).
In summary, they are:
- Grenfell Tower’s original design, construction, composition
- subsequent modifications prior to the most recent
- modifications to the interior of the building 2012-2016
- modifications to the exterior of the building 2012-2016 (including cladding and insulation)
- the fire and safety measures within the building at the time of the fire
- inspections
- governance/management
- communications with residents
- fire advice to residents 2012 to 14 June 2017
- response to recommendations
- the fire
- the response of the emergency services
- the aftermath
At the inquiry, Millett is going through the history of Grenfell Tower, who built it, who managed it, its size and its location.
On the screen, a 3D model of Grenfell Tower is shown and its surrounding area.
A cross-section shows flat 16, on the fourth floor, where the fire broke out, and the escape route from flat 16.
Origin of fire pinpointed
The fire started in or around a fridge freezer in the kitchen of Flat 16, according to evidence from Prof Niamh Nic Daeid, an expert in fire investigations and forensic science at Dundee University.
It is then thought to have spread out of the kitchen window and re-entered Flat 16 through a bedroom window, then spreading through the flat.
Her report to the inquiry concluded:
On the basis of the available evidence, it is more likely than not that the area of origin of the fire was in, or around, the tall fridge freezer in the southeast part of the kitchen.
The cause of the fire remains undetermined although, based on the available information, it is more likely than not be be an accidental cause rather than a deliberate act.
The originating fire within flat 16 extended out of the kitchen window of the flat and at some point re-entered through the window of the bedroom next to the living room of flat 16 causing further damage to the flat.
Her report states that once the fire had re-entered , it spread from the bedroom into the hallway and then re-entered the kitchen, causing further damage to the kitchen.
This further damage would not have prevented determination of the area of origin and the cause of the initial fire.
She said the area between the fridge freezer and the window contained materials that were currently unknown, and this area is also included in the area of origin.
Further electrical examination is required of the materials recovered from flat 16. Once the identity of the materials in the space between the tall fridge freezer and the window are known and the findings of the electrical examination are available, there would be further consideration and her report would be updated and opinions relating to the area of origin of the fire may change accordingly, the report stated.
She did not carry out a first hand investigation, but was asked to review the work undertaken by the initial fire investigation teams, and was provided with evidence including reports, witness statements photographs and video. She undertook two site visits in October and November.
The counsel to the inquiry says the expert reports published this morning “identify a number of important lines of inquiry, particularly how the building performed on the night” and how the fire spread.
He stresses that they can only identify “provisional views” before evidence is heard. He also says they are expressions of expert opinions and it is for the inquiry chair to reach conclusions.
Millet says there may be differing opinions at times.
Millett explains that after his opening statement, the rest of the week will see opening statements from representatives of core participants.
A statement regarding flat 16 on the fourth floor, where the fire began, will be read on Thursday 21 June, he says. The resident at the time will have an opportunity to give oral evidence in September.
From Monday 25 June, firefighters’ evidence will be heard, with 52 being called and the testimonies of another 72 being read into evidence.
Witness statements from bereaved, survivors and residents will commence from 5 September, timed for when children have gone back to school.
Millet outlines the expert reports published this morning:
- Prof Niamh Nic Daeid on the cause and spread of the fire in the flat of origin and the spread of fire within and out of that compartment.
- Prof Luke Bisby on the ignition of the façade materials (including the cladding and insulation) and the fire spread over the building’s external façade.
- Dr Barbara Lane on the fire protection measures within the building and preliminary conclusions on the extent to which they failed to control the spread of fire and smoke and contributed to the speed at which the fire spread.
- Prof Jose Torero on to the fire spread throughout the building.
- Colin Todd on the different statutory and regulatory requirements in force over the lifetime of Grenfell Tower.
The counsel to the inquiry says some core participants have not “positively engaged” with phase one issues as to the active and passive fire safety issues, describing it as a “missed opportunity”. Millett says he hopes they will engage to a greater extent as the inquiry proceeds.
He says the inquiry has not made an independent investigation of how many people died in the fire (you might recall that many residents felt the death toll was higher than the official figure).
So, the inquiry is going by the Met police’s figure of 71 killed by the fire. He refers to Maria del Pilar Burton who died in January and was honoured in the commemoration hearings of the inquiry but says she is not included within the official death toll.
Millett says that core participants have had confidential access to the expert reports ahead of them being made public (they were published on the inquiry website this morning). As such, he says, little will be of surprise to them but “much will be new to the public”.
He runs through the scope of phase 1 of the inquiry.
Millet says the focus of phase one will be the events of the night of 14 June 2017 “and the state of the building at the time of the fire ...when and how the fire started, the development of the fire and smoke, how the fire spread to other parts of the building”.
He says it will also address how come the insulation came to contain combustible materials.
How did so many people sign this building off as safe? Was saving money put before saving lives?
Introducing the inquiry team, Millet says:
We have a duty to be independent, objective, fair-minded and rigorous.
He says there are 531 core participants, including 21 children under age 18 who have not been named plus two individuals who have been anonymised. There are also 29 organisations among the core participants.
Richard Millet QC says “the fundamental question at the heart of our work” is how in London in 2017 a domestic fire spread so “catastrophically”, shattering families, devastating the community and bequeathing an inheritance of “injustice, betrayal and marginalisation”. In summary, he says the question is “Why?”
The chair to the inquiry, Martin Moore-Blick invites Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry to begin the opening statement.
Millet begins and simultaneously five expert reports are published on the inquiry website.
An evidence page has been added to the website and five of the Inquiry' provisional reports are available to view and download: https://t.co/yEFO3oTJn9
— Grenfell Inquiry (@grenfellinquiry) June 4, 2018
In case you missed it over the weekend, Edward Daffarn, the Grenfell Tower resident who issued warnings in 2016 that disaster would strike, told the Guardian in an interview that he expects the inquiry to expose every part of the decision-making process before the fire as “rotten and cancerous”.
He said:
Every single link in this chain is going to be found to be rotten and cancerous. The government didn’t implement the inquest recommendations after the Lakanal House fire where six people died in 2009. Had they done that Grenfell wouldn’t have happened. RBKC (Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea) failed to carry out scrutiny of the TMO (tenants management organisation).
The way the TMO operated, the handling of the contracts, the construction, through to the building regs, the materials that were used, the consultation process.
Here is the schedule for this week. The inquiry will not sit on Fridays, save in exceptional circumstances.
This is the provisional schedule for the week commencing 4 June. https://t.co/xSJwKxjoCZ pic.twitter.com/hIaj2QZ0V1
— Grenfell Inquiry (@grenfellinquiry) June 1, 2018
Updated
Welcome to our continuing live coverage of the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire.
After, seven days of incredibly moving - and at times harrowing - tributes to those who died, attention will turn today to the task of trying to establish exactly what happened and what can be done to prevent a future occurrence.
To that end, the opening statement will be set out today by Richard Millett, counsel to the inquiry.
As part of that process, more than 2,000 pages of documents are expected to be released on to the inquiry’s website at 10am as they are adduced into evidence.
These are the documents due to be published:
- Prof Niamh Nic Daeid on the cause and spread of the fire in the flat of origin and the spread of fire within and out of that compartment.
- Prof Luke Bisby on the ignition of the façade materials (including the cladding and insulation) and the fire spread over the building’s external façade.
- Dr Barbara Lane on the fire protection measures within the building and preliminary conclusions on the extent to which they failed to control the spread of fire and smoke and contributed to the speed at which the fire spread.
- Prof Jose Torero on to the fire spread throughout the building.
- Colin Todd on the different statutory and regulatory requirements in force over the lifetime of Grenfell Tower.
We will be bringing you live coverage of the opening statements and we will also have a team of journalists sifting through the reports as soon as they are released to try to identify the key points of evidence.
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