Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif’s remarks during a live news interview, that his country has been doing “dirty work” for the West for the last three decades, was a stunning admission on Islamabad’s long history of supporting, training and funding terrorist organisations. A decade ago, former army chief and president General Pervez Musharraf made a similar confession on public television, bragging about Pakistan’s role in supporting and training militant groups in Kashmir’s freedom struggle.
Pakistan’s identity as a fountainhead of terror and a safe haven for various militant groups is a well-documented and widely acknowledged reality.
Terrorism has been deeply embedded in Pakistan transforming into a ‘breeding ground’ of armed militants, several jihadi and terror groups of conflicting ideologies since the 1980s. From arming the Afghan Mujahideen under the CIA’s Operation Cyclone to raising militant groups to fight in Kashmir, allying with the United States on the War on Terror, to facing threats from domestic militant groups, Pakistan’s involvement with terrorism has been deeply convoluted and strategic.
Even as the Indian armed forces fired missiles at nine locations in Punjab and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir to neutralise terror sites, the terror infrastructure of various armed militant groups operating within the country remains entrenched and intact. Dismantling and eradicating the entrenched terror infrastructure remains a herculean challenge, given its deep-rooted networks, ideological support bases, and financial links with the all-powerful military establishment.
“Pakistan’s military establishment wields tremendous influence due to its huge stake in the so-called ‘economic-industrial complex and control over financial levers,” notes Col Rajeev Agarwal, former director of military intelligence and senior consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation in Delhi.
He adds that Pakistan has used its financial leverage to use militant groups as strategic assets or to suppress them as and when required, enabling it to maintain its supremacy in the domestic power hierarchy as well as to exert power and influence externally against its neighbours India, Afghanistan and even Iran.
“To weaken the terror infrastructure under the military’s control, it will be crucial to choke the economic lines that would hurt their business networks and military assets – creating a cascading effect,” he said.
The terror landscape in Pakistan spans the entire country, encompassing a diverse array of armed militant, fundamentalist and separatist groups, the majority of which are united by Islamist extremist ideology. Jihadi groups like al-Qaeda, Islamic State-Khorasan Province are active in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the North West; the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, known as the Durand Line has a strong presence of Taliban, Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whereas in Balochistan and separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army and Baloch Liberation Front conduct attacks against varied targets in Balochistan and Sindh provinces.
According to the 2023 US Congressional Research Services Report, Pakistan is home to 15 armed militant groups, of which 12 are proscribed as Foreign Terrorist Organisations. They are categorised as India- and Kashmir-centric, Afghan focussed, domestic militants, sectarian and global jihadi groups.
The India- and Kashmir-focused groups like LeT, JeM, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami, and Harakat-ul-Mujahidin; Afghanistan-oriented factions like Afghan Taliban, and global jihadist networks like AQ, AQIS and IS-KP, form the external component of the militant eco-system. Whereas on the domestic front, there are insurgent and extremist groups such as TTP – an alliance of extremist groups, the BLA and BLF, Jaish al-Adl, and sectarian outfits like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
Italian researcher and Director of Research of The Khorasan Diary, Riccardo Valle, who tracks jihadist movements in the region, said the terror groups are polarised and heterogeneous, following different objectives, ideologies, separate operations and command structures. For instance, the AQ and Taliban are ideologically at odds with the ISKP; the Taliban harbours and actively supports the TTP, which routinely conducts attacks across the border in Pakistan.
“There is widespread support within Pakistan towards the so-called Kashmir cause, and the actions of Kashmiri militant groups due to sentimental reasons and historic grievances. But groups such as the TTP, Baloch separatists, and anti-Shia outfits pose significant threats to the country’s internal security,” he says.
Pakistan has borne the brunt of domestic terrorism since 2003, when it began cracking down on extremist groups as part of its participation in the US-led War on Terror. It has faced severe backlash from domestic militant groups who have conducted large-scale bombings in schools, markets, mosques and against the security establishments and civilians, resulting in large-scale casualties.
In 2023, the country recorded the highest number of terrorist incidents globally, with 490 attacks. The violence continued into 2024 with rising military escalation; in the first eight months alone, 757 people were killed and nearly as many injured, according to data from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS).
Animesh Roul, executive director of the New Delhi-based think-tank, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, says the Pakistani security establishment faces threats from several militant groups, except for the Kashmir-centric groups. “The military has nurtured Kashmiri groups with funds, arms and training for decades, and Rawalpindi has full control over them. They have never carried out any terrorist activities within the country. But others like ISKP and TTP have different goals, like establishing an Islamic State and overthrowing the Pakistani government.”
Pakistan has faced diplomatic isolation because of being a safe haven for extremist groups. But despite overwhelming evidence on Pakistan’s use of armed militants to advance its foreign policy and domestic political goals, Islamabad has managed to evade being listed as “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” resulting in sweeping sanctions, including restrictions on foreign aid, bans on arms sales, and controls.
India’s attempts to mobilise the international community to act against Pakistan or designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism at the United Nations have been consistently and systematically thwarted by its ally, China. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location and role as a key strategic partner in regional security dynamics and logistical support in Afghanistan have also deterred the US and NATO countries from taking harsher measures.
Valle emphasises that although the military establishment has a history of supporting militant groups operating in Kashmir, it lacks the means to control the increasingly fragmented militant landscape. Many terror groups have acquired greater autonomy and are waging a war against the state establishment.
Experts cite the 2014 Army school massacre by TTP, killing 141 people, mostly children in Peshawar; the bombing at Sufi saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in 2017 by the Islamic State, suicide bombings by the Pakistani Taliban member Jamaat-ur-Ahrar, among others, as a result of sanctuaries on Pakistan soil.
Valle states that the security agencies face an uphill task to launch a comprehensive crackdown due to “fear of public backlash, political repercussions, and limited financial resources to sustain large-scale counter-insurgency operations.” The infamous operation Zarb-e-Azb by the army in 2015 to flush out various local and foreign militant groups, including the TTP, Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement and Lashkar-e-Islam, from North Waziristan, led to a heavy backlash. While an estimated 500 to 2,000 militants were killed, the operation internally displaced over 9 lakh people, fueling local resentment against the military. The offensive reignited the insurgency with the emergence of new insurgent groups.
Since 2015, the military has worked to degrade the overall capacity of these militant groups as part of broader efforts to remove Pakistan from the Financial Action Task Force’s ‘grey list’ related to terrorist financing. But there remains widespread support towards jihadi activities. According to the Australian government's latest country report released in April, the government has defined jihadi groups as ‘allies’ leading to an increased domestic sympathy for insurgents and religiously inspired militant groups. The increased public sympathy has helped militant groups to recruit from madrassas and operate with relative impunity, even when they carried out violent attacks against Pakistani citizens.
Pakistan’s attempts to wipe out fundamentalism and extremism within the country have proved fatal in the past. The siege of Lal Masjid in 2007, in the wake of General Musharraf’s unconditional support to the US’s War on Terror, marked a pivotal movement in the army’s relationship with the Islamist militancy. The operation emboldened fundamentalists and led to a wave of suicide bombings. The TTP, which emerged in its aftermath, is now the deadliest terrorist group operating in Pakistan, mounting bloody attacks on Pakistani security forces and their families.
Pakistan’s strategy of breeding terror groups for its geopolitical advantage has led to a dangerous security dilemma. It can no longer control its non-state ‘strategic assets’ without risking a bloody blowback.
India and Kashmir-centric groups
Pakistan’s use of armed militants to achieve its national security objectives can be traced back to the time of Partition. The first Kashmir war in 1947 was triggered after the Pakistani military launched an incursion of Pashtun tribal fighters into Jammu and Kashmir to annex the Muslim-majority territory. It has since then persistently sustained its aggression over Kashmir.
Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the Pakistani military redirected its focus toward the insurgency in Kashmir, adopting a “war by other means” strategy to advance its objectives in the region. The ISI sponsored hundreds of foreign and local jihadis who looked for new frontlines to continue the holy war in Kashmir. It also facilitated the infiltration of militant groups active in the Afghan jihad, such as Harkat-ul-Ansar, LeT, and its parent organisation, Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad, to fight against the Indian establishment.
The battle-hardened foreign militants hijacked the indigenous Kashmiri struggle for the right to self-determination into a pro-Pakistan, Islamist war. The presence of foreign fighters among the militants in Kashmir went up from 15 per cent in 1994 to 40 per cent in 1998.
JeM’s Maulana Masood Azhar was among these foreign militants who was captured and detained in the Kot Bhalwal Jail in Jammu. He was released in exchange for hostages during the IC-814 hijack of an Indian airline flight in 1999.
In 2001, Masood Azhar orchestrated a retaliatory attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, bringing India and Pakistan to the brink of war. Between 2001 and 2007, there was a surge in attacks by Pakistan-based militant groups across the country. Attack on the American cultural centre, Kolkata and the Akshardham temple in 2002, Mumbai train blasts in 2005 and 2006, bore the unmistakable imprints of Pakistan.
In a most brazen terror attack, LeT terrorists besieged Mumbai, killing more than 160 people over three days. Ajmal Kasab, the lone Pakistani terrorist who was captured alive, confessed to being trained in a LeT camp in Muridke, Punjab province, for the operation. Led by Hafiz Saeed, LeT enjoys the support of the Pakistani intelligence and Al Qaeda. Following international pressure, Saeed was convicted of terror financing and imprisoned in 2020 for 78 years.
Presently, LeT and JeM remain the main India- and Kashmir-focused terror groups. Fighters from both groups are known to operate across India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. According to Indian intelligence reports, these groups have an estimated 16 terror sites in POK, located close to the Pakistan Army camps. Prospective militants are groomed for carrying out commando-style operations and cross-border infiltration. They are trained on planning and executing terror strikes in India. From basic weapons handling to communication technology, specialised training on combat, jungle survival, jungle warfare, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and using drones.
Afghan-focused
During 2001 to 2021, the Quetta Shura Taliban, with an estimated 20,000 armed Afghan militants, was based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Its leadership is believed to be operating from the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta, as well as Karachi and Peshawar. The Haqqani Network, which now has an estimated 5000 militants led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, operate near the Durand line. The Haqqanis are linked to the ISI, a charge denied by Pakistan.
Domestic
TTP is widely regarded as the deadliest terrorist group operating in Pakistan. Largely composed of ethnic Pashtun militants, the TTP leadership included representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven former tribal agencies. The TTP leaders fled into the eastern border areas of Afghanistan after Pakistani military operations in 2014. Since 2021, the group has resurfaced and is led by Noor Wali Mehsud. The TTP’s estimated 3,000-6,000 cadre enjoys training and logistic support from AQ. The group seeks to overthrow the government and establish Sharia law like the Afghan Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The BLA was named as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in 2019. The separatist group has up to 1,000 armed militants and has targeted China’s investment projects and Chinese nationals working in Balochistan.
Jaysh al-Adl (aka Jundallah), designated as an FTO in 2010, is an ethnic Baloch separatist group operating in and from Pakistan’s Balochistan province, oriented primarily toward Iran and its ethnic Baloch regions.
Sectarian
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, aka Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat) is an anti-Shia group established in Punjab in the mid-1980s. Its 3,000-6,000 members operate mainly in the former FATA, Punjab, and Karachi.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is an SSP offshoot designated as an FTO in 2013. With membership in the low hundreds, LEJ operates mainly in the former FATA, Punjab, Balochistan, and Karachi, as well as in Afghanistan. It reportedly has close ties with both AQ and the TTP.
Global
Al Qaeda “core” is operated primarily from the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas. AQ’s capacity has been seriously degraded, but it maintains ties to numerous other Pakistan-based terror groups and continues its focus in the region through AQIS. AQIS was formerly led by Indian national Asim Umar and was designated as an FTO in 2016. It has an estimated 200 to 400 members who are mainly active in doling out propaganda literature in various Indian languages.
The ISKP is a regional affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and has been active in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region since 2015. Most of its estimated 3,000-5,000 fighters are former TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and former Taliban fighters.
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