The developments of February 3, 2021 marked the crystallisation and popular production of a new posture in India’s engagement with the world — that of hard sovereignty. The posture delivers a firm message: outsiders have no stake in India’s internal affairs, especially as it undergoes profound and rapid changes, some of which are deeply disturbing. The posture is unprecedented and dangerous; we will do disservice to ourselves if we endorse it. And policy informed by it will expose inconsistencies in our external relations.
New posture
Over the past 18 months or so, the establishment had been regularly fielding international criticism and expressions of concern on domestic developments such as the changes within Jammu and Kashmir, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA)-National Register of Citizens protests and the ensuing Delhi riots. One of the elements in its reactions was the assertion that these were India’s internal matters which its democratic polity was capable of resolving. The references to internal affairs conspicuously foregrounded the domestic dimension of the state’s sovereignty.
India must return to traditional diplomacy
Against this backdrop came the press statement by the External Affairs Ministry on February 3. It expressed official India’s displeasure at social media remarks by well-known figures, including a global celebrity and an activist, on the response to the farmers’ protests. Official facts were put forward. The claim was made that ‘vested interests’ had tried to derail the protests and sully India’s international reputation. ‘Celebrities and others’ were advised to ascertain facts before commenting on the matter and to resist the temptation of sensationalising it.
This detailed and somewhat oddly phrased statement was measured in its operative part. However, it ended with two hashtags. One suggested that there was propaganda, presumably global, against India. The other sought to rally Indians against it. Soon, celebrities, partisans of the regime at the Centre, and a large body of concerned Indians picked up where the statement had left off. The hashtags were extensively used as a multitude of statements containing expressions of respect for the farmers and the need to resolve the issue amicably while calling for Indians to stay united swirled about on Twitter.
From the intellectual churning arose the posture on hard sovereignty. Sachin Tendulkar’s loaded tweet captured the underlying theory. The statements by outsiders threatened to compromise India’s sovereignty. They could watch the internal goings on, but had no right to participate in them. Only Indians could ‘decide’ for India, and they had to remain united as a nation. Tendulkar had drawn the boundary line. The posture had been popularly produced.
India has jealously guarded its sovereignty since independence. However, its past sovereignty posture was deployed towards progressive goals. It was a bulwark against great power bullying and it asserted the autonomy of weaker nations. In contrast, the new posture seeks to fend off international criticism of unpleasant domestic developments. While this may suit hyper-nationalism, it will harm national interest.
First, India’s global game of status seeking and strategic influence plays out on the turf of liberal democracies. The Prime Minister’s claim of having enhanced India’s international prestige has had as its ace reference point the recognition offered to him, and by extension India, by principally conservative forces within western democracies. Remove the spectacles of bonhomie with former U.S. President Donald Trump, warm relations with former U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, the tactical use of the Ab ki baar slogan, the events of Madison Square Garden (2014), Wembley Stadium (2015), the London townhall (2018), ‘Howdy, Modi!’ (2019), ‘Namaste Trump’ (2020) as well as the New Delhi tea with former U.S. President Barack Obama and the claim weakens.
On the strategic front, five of India’s key partners in the Indo-Pacific context are democracies: Japan, Australia, the U.S., the U.K., and France. Four of these are liberal and western. A special understanding exists among liberal democracies because they share common norms and beliefs. That human rights are universal and inviolable is one of them, and this gives governments and the civil society within liberal democracies the moral authority to nudge, criticise or rebuke a partner that doesn’t match up. Democracies measure each other by higher standards. This explains the pushback of varying degrees from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and even Mr. Trump in the past two years. It also explains the concerns expressed by western legislators and human rights bodies. If the establishment adopts a hard sovereignty posture soaring on the wings of strident domestic sentiments, it would encounter greater diplomatic friction. India’s global game would also be adversely impacted.
Siege mentality
Second, hard sovereignty invariably tends towards national isolationism and siege mentality. Chances are high it would further strengthen the national-scale parochialism being encouraged by the rhetoric of Aatmanirbharta (self-reliance). Such trends have an uneven impact. Those who championed hard sovereignty would soon be at an elite sporting event in a western capital. But they would have left their fellow citizens beleaguered. At a time when public sympathy for dissenters is at a discount, critics are being labelled, and institutions are falling short on their constitutional obligations, hard sovereignty falls like an axe on the sapping morale of non-violent social movements. Social movements do not follow the diktats and rhythms of sovereign states. They draw energy through transnational solidarities and bring about important policy corrections within and across states. Case in point: Black Lives Matter, which our celebrities supported. Imagine the consequences of being further marooned for social struggles hitherto considered indispensable to the health of Indian democracy.
Finally, it would increase the susceptibility of our neighbourhood policy to criticism on the grounds of inconsistency. Consider the CAA, 2019. Although the letter of the amendment doesn’t state it, the accompanying public discourse has carried an indictment of India’s Muslim-majority neighbours insofar as their treatment of minorities is concerned. Is it unlikely that we will hear governments and others within our neighbourhood decry us for interfering in their internal affairs? Indeed, the Pakistan Foreign Office took this line in December 2019 as the CAA was passing parliamentary process. It won’t be surprising if others followed, especially if equations turned sour, as they periodically do on the subcontinent. Consider also how it would undercut the effectiveness of what is principally a tactical arsenal even if it is grounded in facts: pointing out the dismal human rights situation in Balochistan to the liberal democratic world. If we are discomfited at expressions of solidarity with protesting farmers, why should the international liberals offer us traction?
India’s reputation had long been the soft power capital it deployed to meet its hard power shortfall as it pursued its international ambitions. As that reputation suffers, the country’s options lessen and effectiveness shrinks. Scarcely a welcome development for a ‘leading power’. We must counter interventionist remarks coming from vested interests. But we must be discerning as well, for some critics may mean well.
Atul Mishra teaches international relations at Shiv Nadar University. Views are personal
