Allegations of drug use, bribes, facilitation of drug importation and terrorism financing by agriculture department officers were unable to be investigated because of gaps in the federal anti-corruption watchdog’s powers.
That is the warning from the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) to a parliamentary inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s borders.
In its submission, the ACLEI argues that overlapping responsibilities of border agencies and parts of the agriculture department being beyond its reach are making it harder to police Australia’s borders.
The ACLEI has only partial coverage of the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment, with oversight of 1,000 departmental staff including regional managers, those undertaking clearance of vessels or cargo imported into Australia and those with access to the integrated cargo system.
The ACLEI submitted its “ability to prevent and investigate corruption at Australia’s sea ports and airports is … challenged” by the gap in its jurisdiction.
“This may result in alleged persons of interest being excluded from ACLEI consideration because at the time of the conduct, the officer was not working in the particular area covered by ACLEI’s jurisdiction,” it said.
It gave three case studies including allegations of:
“Drug use and inappropriate association by an agriculture officer who inspected mail was deemed not to be in the jurisdiction of the integrity commissioner.”
“Acceptance of bribes to clear consignments by an agriculture officer performing duties in inspection services [was] deemed not to be in jurisdiction of integrity commissioner as officer worked in the export rather than import stream.”
“Facilitation of drug importations and terrorism financing by an agriculture officer [was] deemed not to be in jurisdiction of the integrity commissioner as the date of alleged conduct did not coincide with times when the officer held positions considered to be within … jurisdiction.”
A spokeswoman for the ACLEI confirmed the examples “arise from ACLEI assessments and investigations”. “They are … based on real life ACLEI cases.”
The ACLEI argued that staff at law enforcement agencies have access to critical information even if they don’t work on the front line, a “vulnerability” that should be fixed by bringing the whole agency within its jurisdiction.
The ACLEI also submitted that overlapping responsibilities make its work difficult because “notifications alleging corrupt conduct by officers at the port or airport that very often do not delineate between agencies”.
Tipoffs such as “someone at X port is helping get drugs through” are harder to investigate with two agencies running border checks, and with shared access to systems such as the Department of Home Affairs’ ICS cargo management system.
“The close interrelation of the work of border agency officers illustrates the importance of having a common, end-to-end oversight regime for commonwealth law enforcement agencies within a specific function or environment,” it said.
ACLEI submitted that corruption of border officers “remains a real and significant threat in Australia”. It cited the fact that of 146 referrals it received in 2018-19, 63 related to agriculture and home affairs, with the majority of those related to border functions.
“Several major ACLEI investigations have uncovered evidence that organised crime groups actively recruit and compromise law enforcement and border officials to facilitate their illicit operations.”
The submission bolsters the case to simplify the overlapping responsibilities of the Australian Border Force and the agriculture department’s biosecurity officers as well as calls to expand the ACLEI’s jurisdiction.
The ACLEI was set to be expanded into a Commonwealth Integrity Commission under the Coalition’s alternative proposal for anti-corruption commission, which has been put on the policy backburner.
The inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border arrangements is a long-running inquiry that began in the 44th parliament and was rebooted in the 45th and 46th parliaments. Submissions closed on 1 May.
The agriculture department submitted it “continues to work closely with ACLEI in strengthening its ability to detect, deter and respond to corruption at the border”.
While it said corruption was not systemic, the department gave examples of two cases successfully prosecuted in 2019 and two further cases currently before the courts relating to personal gain, unauthorised access to sensitive information and modifying restricted data.
The department submitted when cases are not within ACLEI’s jurisdiction they are investigated internally.
It reported “a moderate increase in allegations of, and investigations into fraud and corruption over the past two years”, which it attributed to its improved investigative capability.
The department asked for legislative changes to be treated as a law enforcement agency to gain information sharing powers and the ability manage the fraud risk in its own ranks by requiring staff to report misconduct and submit to random drug and alcohol tests.
The department also warned it is “increasingly reliant” on independent contractors who are not covered by ACLEI’s jurisdiction despite performing like tasks, which it described as a “vulnerability”.
