Mali, a landlocked Sahelian nation of 25 million people, has faced significant instability since 2012, marked by terrorism, state neglect and armed conflicts.
That year a Tuareg rebellion started in northern Mali and President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a military coup. Constitutional rule was suspended. Rebels in northern Mali went on to seize cities like Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, declaring an independent Islamic State of Azawad and imposing sharia law.
They also destroyed cultural heritage sites, including 14 of Timbuktu’s 16 Unesco-listed mausoleums. The crisis prompted international intervention, including a UN authorised mission, which retook northern cities within weeks. Islamist rebels retreated into civilian populations and remote areas.
Despite these efforts, violence against civilians by extremist groups and community militias has continued. By 2023, 8.8 million Malians needed humanitarian assistance. Over 375,500 were internally displaced, primarily women and children.
Meanwhile, the former French colony had turned to China for military assistance. Between 2012 and 2013, China provided €5 million (about US$5.8 million) in logistical equipment to improve the Malian army’s mobility.
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In August 2013, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army gave the Malian army military supplies totalling 1.6 billion CFA francs (about US$2.8 million). China made similar donations between 2014 and 2023.
I am an international security and global governance researcher. My recent research explored the impact of China’s security sector assistance on Mali’s fragility.
China’s assistance to Mali aims to equip the country to address terrorism and insurgency. But I argue that it may have unintended consequences and cause further damage to the country.
The heavy reliance on Chinese supply exposes Mali to vulnerabilities, including supply disruptions, diminished bargaining power, and limited strategic flexibility. This could destabilise security even more should China face manufacturing issues or supply chain disruptions leading to delays or shortages in the production of weapons.
It also raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence policies and decision-making processes. In turn this could entrench the Malian military government’s position. China takes a hands-off approach to the governance structures of the countries it engages with. Hopes of democratisation in the country could be affected.
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Rich in resources
Mali has significant natural resources, including 800 tons of gold reserves (it’s Africa’s fourth-largest producer), iron ore, manganese, lithium, and potential uranium and hydrocarbon deposits.
In 2019, gold production generated US$734 million, or 9.7% of Mali’s GDP, supporting over 10% of the population.
Chinese firms, such as Ganfeng Lithium and China National Nuclear Corporation, have invested heavily in Mali’s mining sector. They are involved in a US$130 million lithium project and uranium exploration in the Kidal and Falea regions.
Despite security risks, including attacks on Chinese personnel in 2015 and 2021, China remains committed due to Mali’s resource potential.
Beyond mining, China has invested in Mali’s infrastructure. A US$2.7 billion railway modernisation project connects Bamako to Dakar, facilitating resource exports like iron ore and bauxite.
The total of Mali’s external debt to China is not explicitly stated. But the 2014 loan agreement of US$11 billion and the 2016 loan of US$2.7 billion alone suggest Mali’s debt to China could be at least US$13 billion. This is without including loans for projects like the Bamako-Ségou expressway, and bridges in Bamako.
This has often been criticised as “debt trap diplomacy”, increasing recipient countries’ dependence on Beijing. In Mali, I believe this risks entrenching economic vulnerability and giving China geopolitical leverage.
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China’s security sector assistance to Mali
Historically, Mali relied on France. More recently, it’s used Russia’s expeditionary corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, for security support.
In 2011, China provided US$11.4 million in grants, US$8.1 million in zero-interest loans, and a US$100.8 million concessional loan to foster bilateral cooperation.
China’s participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, starting in 2013 with 395 personnel, marked a shift in its security engagement.
Chinese peacekeepers, including engineers, medical personnel and security guards, repaired infrastructure, provided medical aid and supported Mali’s 2013 elections.
Their professionalism earned praise from the UN special envoy Albert Gerard Koenders for helping to ensure a smooth election.
China’s involvement in Mali challenged traditional European approaches to peacekeeping, particularly France’s military-heavy strategy.
How China’s assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility
In spite of the positives, China’s security sector assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility in several ways.
First, its no-strings-attached nature allows Mali’s military junta to consolidate power without making democratic or governance reforms.
This lack of accountability enables corrupt military factions to operate unchecked. Governance weaknesses and authoritarianism can continue.
Second, the heavy reliance on Chinese supply raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence decisions.
This over-reliance on military solutions risks escalating conflicts and could lead to human rights abuses by security forces, as seen in increased violence against civilians. It doesn’t address root causes of conflict like social cohesion or local governance.
Third, Mali’s growing dependence on Chinese aid — both military and economic — makes it vulnerable to disruptions from geopolitical tensions, supply chain issues, or changes in China’s foreign policy. This limits Mali’s ability to diversify its military capabilities or respond to evolving threats.
Finally, China’s infrastructure investments, such as the US$1.48 billion (750 billion CFA francs) Bamako-Dakar railway loan, creates “debt trap diplomacy”.
This pattern deepens economic dependence and reduces policy autonomy, further weakening state resilience.
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The way forward
To mitigate the risks of Chinese security sector assistance and promote sustainable stability, Mali must adopt a multifaceted strategy.
First, it should collaborate with China to align security sector assistance with civilian-led security approaches.
Second, Mali should diversify security and economic partnerships with donors like the US, the UK, and the EU.
Third, transparent guidelines, developed through consultation with stakeholders, should assess the impacts of assistance to avoid deepening dependence.
Fourth, engaging civil society and publishing regular reports on security sector assistance use and outcomes will foster public trust.
Finally, promoting regional economic integration and ties with global powers will bolster Mali’s economic resilience.
Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
