The renowned Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci in one of his more elucidating passages in his central work The Prison Notebooks makes a critical distinction between the “permanent” and the “occasional” factors in politics. When we focus too much on individual political figures or incidents of a time, we miss the structural forces informing why they came to prominence at that particular moment.
So too in football, we often fixate on the headline moments of matches – goals, red cards, contentious refereeing decisions – rather than the underlying structural determinates that significantly affect who will win a game.
Look at the three headline moments (ie. the goals) from the critical clash between Perth Glory and Wellington Phoenix this weekend and you’ll learn very little about the tactical battle. The first comes from a defensive mistake, the second an unstoppable piledriver, the third a tremendous piece of individual skill and determination.
Underpinning these moments however are deeper patterns of play, that even out across the duration of a season. It’s no coincidence Wellington Phoenix boast the joint-meanest defence in the league, and the third best attack – and two crucial factors informing this were evident against Perth: Wellington’s control of the respective “danger zones”; and their emphasis on balls to feet in attacking areas.
In his fascinating feature on Brentford/FC Midtjylland’s maverick chairman, Sean Ingle highlights the increasing statistical preoccupation with physical areas of a football pitch in which goals are created (and conversely conceded) – identifying a “danger zone” from which three-quarters of goals in the English Premier League are scored.
Turning to the A-League, Gil Albertson has identified how Wellington Phoenix and Nathan Burns in particular have (at least over the first half of the season) had the highest ratio of shots taken inside the box, and with Burns in particular boasting one of the best conversion rates in the league. So how do they fashion such consistent opportunities in such dangerous areas?
Crucial to their win against Perth was Wellington’s maintenance of personnel in key areas – in attack the No10 role, and conversely in defence the No6 role – and secondly, their style of play emphasising balls on the ground, to feet.
While Ernie Merrick has modulated his tactical system throughout the season, a key feature against Perth was the “dual 10s” roles of Roly Bonevacia and Michael McGlinchey, and conversely the “dual sixes” roles of Albert Riera and Vince Lia.
With his trademark disregard for symmetry, Merrick employed a lopsided 4-4-2 diamond (or 4-3-3, with a “false nine”), with Bonevacia frequenting the “danger zone”, and McGlinchey almost as a “spare No10” should the Dutchman find himself occupied elsewhere on the pitch.
Likewise, the pattern of movement between Riera and Lia showed a similar symbiotic awareness, the Spaniard given the primary function of screening the back four, but with Lia closely in attendance should the zone become temporarily left unprotected, or should an extra opponent make a late run into that area.
In the 19th minute we saw one such example of the effectiveness of the “spare 10”.
From a goal kick a forward run from Bonevacia draws the attentions both of Dino Djulbic and Ruben Zadkovich, with the Dutchman flattened in the challenge. The ball breaks for Lia who plays a first-time ball wide to Roy Krishna. From his central-left position McGlinchey is then able to make a late run (unmarked) into the box for a one-on-one with Danny Vukovic. On this occasion, the ball is slightly overhit, but the passage is illustrative. McGlinchey’s initial wide position puts him outside of the interest of markers, but when Bonevacia vacates the “danger zone” (taking with him his opponents), the space lies open for McGlinchey to exploit.
A second key feature of the Phoenix’s play was their hesitance to whip in crosses, preferring instead to play balls to feet, especially targeting Bonevacia and McGlinchey centrally.
In round 21, the other nine A-League sides attempted between nine and 27 crosses throughout the 90 minutes – for Wellington Phoenix this figure was just four. With this figure significantly higher in recent weeks this suggests a deliberate tactic from Merrick, coming in dramatic contrast to Perth’s own tally, a round high of 27.
For Melbourne City, also with 27 crosses, this tactic plays directly to their strengths, as the towering Josh Kennedy is fed by the pacey wingers such as David Williams, Harry Novillo or Iain Ramsay. For Perth Glory though this was either a tactical misjudgement, or an acknowledgement that Merrick’s midfield box had won the centre, thus forcing the home side to attack from the periphery.
As Merrick noted post-game, “It was only crosses coming in, [there was] nothing coming through the middle – and our goalkeeper and centre-backs handled that really well.”
For a side set up to strike in transition, away from home, plenty of crosses merely provide plenty of opportunities to hit on the counter, especially with Bonevacia and McGlinchey probing centrally.
Ominously, Wellington have now beaten all four sides in contention for the premiership in their previous clashes, three of these in the past weeks. Should they improve their form against sides further down the ladder, they look well placed to secure a home final.
For Perth it’s a worrying run of eight games without a win – with personnel largely unchanged, the challenge is for Kenny Lowe to modulate his approach to try and re-spark a push for unprecedented silverware.
