Late last season, Adelaide’s Iberian overlord Josep Gombau sent an ominous message to opposition coaches. As the Reds finally started to accumulate the points their attacking brand of football merited, the Spaniard told gathered media the job was only “half of the way there”.
“There are more steps that we need to do, in terms of tactically. Now is not the moment to make changes because now is the most important part of the season … We will start to work this in pre-season, thinking the second year, that is when really I hope and wish the results will come.”
In just two weeks the fruits of Adelaide’s pre-season labours have become evident. Whilst Gombau maintains it was injuries that forced his hand, out is the 4-3-3, the patient possession-based football that saw the Reds rival Brisbane as chief ball-hogs last season – in is a formation that Lars Lagerback deems ‘a really offensive way of playing’, the attacking 3-4-3.
Now, much is made of formations, with sometimes the mistaken idea that they contain intrinsic qualities – that merely the shuffling of certain positions will miraculously bring attacking football or defensive solidity. 4-4-2s come in many guises, from the dour to the adventurous; and teams can defend in one formation and attack in another. What is remarkable about Gombau’s 3-4-3 is not only that we haven’t seen its like in the A-League, but that it is so much more than just a cookie cutter knock-off of the fabled Barcelona formation, and vastly different to the 3-4-3 that kept Roberto Martinez’s Wigan in the Premier League.
Both against Brisbane Roar and against Melbourne Victory, Adelaide started with the new-look formation – where immediately two key points stand out.
Firstly, there is the ‘lop-sided back three’. In attack, left-back Tarek Elrich is given licence to get forward, as per a conventional full-back, with centre-backs Nigel Boogaard and Dylan McGowan spreading to offer cover. When defending however, the deep-lying midfielder Isaias slots between the two, adopting the role of centre-back, with McGowan pushed out as a right-back. The Reds attack therefore as a three, but defend as a four.
Secondly, therefore is this critical ‘duel role’ that Isaias performs; you can’t call him a centre back, but he’s much more than a defensive midfielder.
So why is this significant?
Against the Victory’s midfield trio of Carl Valeri, Mark Milligan and Gui Finkler, the Reds in attack automatically created superiority in the engine room of the pitch – with Isaias’s shift into midfield creating a simple 4 v 3.
It’s a fascinating innovation from Gombau. With most sides comfortable to keep a ‘spare man’ at the back, here Adelaide take a risk pushing a nominal centre-back into midfield, leaving just 3 v 3 in defence, but gain the reward instantly with the ‘spare’ now in midfield.
For large portions of this game, it was the Reds who therefore controlled and dictated the tempo. Whilst they didn’t always find the final ball, on several occasions Adelaide’s midfield superiority and the ‘dual role’ of Isaias were key however in initiating attacks for the Reds.
In the 22nd minute, Melbourne has possession with their right back Jason Geria. He plays a ball inside to Kosta Barbarouses, who in turn looks to play to the feet of Besart Berisha. Key here is the ‘spare’ Isaias, who rushes out of the defensive line to press and double-man the Victory striker. A tackle is effected and the ball falls free to James Jeggo, who hits a vertical pass to Bruce Djite, who lays it off into open space for the unmarked Pablo Sanchez. He in turns hits a first time pass to Cirio, who plays a clever one-two with Sanchez to round his fullback, before whipping in a cross that almost finds Djite for the opener.
At no stage during Melbourne’s possession does Sanchez attempt to mark anyone, as Adelaide’s numerical superiority enables him to focus on becoming the outlet for an attacking transition.
Evident here too is the significant tweak Gombau has made to the style with which Adelaide play the 3-4-3.
On 26% of occasions Adelaide players looked to play very directly (as opposed to Victory’s 13%); long balls played from defence or midfield up to the attacking line in just one pass. Lest this be attributed to ‘derby’ nerves or a difficult playing surface, against the Roar, Gombau’s men looked long on 20% of occasions to the Roar’s 8%.
In contrast to the ‘tiki-taka’ of the 4-3-3 in Gombau’s first campaign, the season-two remodelled Reds are looking to shift quickly, and to shift vertically. After the game against the Victory, Gombau told SBS this was a formation he wanted to use when chasing a game, or pushing for a result, but that he had played it the last two weeks due to injuries to Osama Malik, Michael Marrone and Jordan Elsey leaving him short at the back.
He could have added too that in the aggressive positioning of the left-back, he has a tactic purpose built for club vice-captain, Cassio, when he returns to full fitness after a long injury lay-off.
Ominously for A-League coaches therefore, we haven’t yet seen Adelaide’s ‘A-game’, so it will be fascinating to see how Gombau’s 4-3-3 has modulated over the off-season as well.
