For all the puzzling inadequacy of this version, we need the Cabinet Manual – or at least something like an authoritative account of how the British system of government works. By 'we' is meant all those who lead the system, in local government, public bodies and the far-flung state as well as the civil service. They/we are in it together, but lack a common text or bible, especially something that starts to relate 'constitutional' matters to the work of public service delivery.
The principal failure of the document criticised by the Commons political and constitutional reform committee should become the starting point for a next iteration. That is marrying the formal procedures of statecraft and the processes of parliamentary and Whitehall decision-making with the dense business of running government, delivering services and securing revenue.
Connect to the people
One reason for the public's disaffection with politics and policy is that it does not see the connection between these two, especially the link between votes and outcomes. In the gap, accountability suffers. The main point of any Cabinet Manual and/or constitutional notebook should surely be to ingratiate public institutions and procedures with the public, in order to increase participation and sharpen the public's sense of ownership of our democracy. Public affairs are too disaggregated, insufficiently joined. We need more synthesis: blending the constitutional conversation with debate about public service delivery, finance and quality.
The point of government – in the eyes of many people – is to provide services, including security and law and order. Government is seen as legitimate (and tax necessary) because it uniquely provides or organises the services we depend on to live a decent life. Often the institutional arrangements that make this possible are a second order of interest and attention, but the link between the two remains.
A new manual ought to make this connection its focus.
It matters to all
Constitutional and formal procedures matter, but not for themselves. Procedures in parliament do not just allow public business to be transacted, but affect its outcomes. We need to acknowledge the inter-relationship of the constitution and public management.
What that requires is a vision that goes well beyond Whitehall and Westminster. It's not just civil servants, ministers and MPs who do proper procedure. Civil servants may, formally speaking, serve the Crown; but they, along with other public servants, serve the public. The delivery of decisions that command public assent (which is part of the definition of constitutionality) depends on the public service at large.
Take local authority leaders and chief executives. Unless they also follow 'the constitution', the system stands to lose not only effectiveness but also legitimacy. Similarly chief police officers, magistrates, and other public officials. Why there is agitation about the cavalier way the government is creating new elected police and crime commissioners is that it does not seem to realise how important propriety and good orderly decision making is in the local space.
Cost and auditing
Any 'constitutional' statement has to talk about money. Due process and procedure may impose charges; democracy costs. There may even at points be a trade off between following a procedure and procuring efficient public services. Now, more than ever, we need a clear account of the audit trail. Who is responsible for ensuring public money is spent lawfully; whose job is value for money? A recent speech by Margaret Hodge, the chair of the Commons public accounts committee, set out a strong vision of parliament's role through the National Audit Office. As public services fragment, and charities and social enterprises assume a large role, auditing becomes more difficult.
A revised Cabinet Manual would surely also have to say more about citizen's grievances and new ways of linking people to services through technology.
Civil service, devolved and local governments
The biggest omission in the Cabinet Manual is over the role of the civil service. The biggest opportunity in redrafting is to redefine it as part of the broader public service. Do we even need any more a cadre of public officials separately designated as 'civil servants'?
How far, for example, is the way civil servants are trained – their attitudes and 'ethos' formed – part of the constitutional settlement? If the civil service is deemed to carry what Professor Peter Hennessy has called a 'genetic' understanding of the codes and conventions of government, then the way civil servants are indoctrinated and their lore passes from generation to generation is both important and itself part of the constitutional set-up. But the same could be said of police officers, NHS managers, local authority executives and the executive managers of arm's length bodies. They are as much weft and woof of government as, no disrespect to them, civil servants in work and pensions or the Scottish government.
And there's another area where we need, and urgently, constitutional clarifications. Are procedures and divisions of power and responsibility within the devolved administrations in any way constitutional matters? Of course they are.
And local government. The public experience the state through services provided by councils and may judge the state through the prism of local decision-making. Should the position of local government be regarded as 'constitutional' as many councillors believe it to be, sometimes citing international conventions on sub-national government? The paid officers of councils who carry statutory duties act with 'constitutional' propriety and so are relevant to the good governance of the kingdom.
Outsourcing public services is rife, and those given to contractors include such sensitive functions as civil service training and personnel management. Consultants supply policy advice. In other words, private companies are taking over a portion of public business. Are such developments constitutionally irrelevant? If constitutionality inheres in understanding and practice of procedure, what significance might the importation of private sector methods and assumptions have?
A step in the right direction
The good government of the UK depends upon 'constitutional' understandings in arm's length bodies, especially those mixing professional self-regulation with state oversight, such as the Financial Reporting Council. The governance, indeed the very existence of quangos is hotly disputed. A new manual might show some awareness of whether the functional differentiation of the tasks of government has constitutional import: the discussion is confined to Whitehall departments and does not venture afar.
And so on. The terrain is changing. No statement is ever going to be definitive. But the need for a coherent account of how we govern ourselves is great. The MPs' critique of Sir Gus O'Donnell's rough draft is a step on the way. And if the Cabinet Office itself won't take the job of redrafting on, why shouldn't the MPs themselves?
