Have we just witnessed dangerous tinkering with the UK's constitution? It's not often this allegation is made, and ever since I first heard about the 55% rule in the Lib Dem – Conservative coalition agreement from my colleague Alan Travis, I have been listening closely to reactions.
The loudest reaction is a general sense of outrage. This is mainly a result of the view that requiring 55% of Commons' votes to dissolve parliament is contrived and undemocratic. A simple majority system makes sense where power is won by first-past-the-post voting. This new figure is not part of any legacy in our democracy, but instead reflects the fact that, were the Lib Dems to join forces with other opposition parties in an attempt to force a general election before 2015, they could only muster 53% of the vote.
The introduction of 55% protects the Queen from being dragged into a dissolution scenario in the event of a collapse in the coalition – which may be constitutionally important but doesn't provoke an overwhelming emotional response in this anti-55% camp. And there is deep disquiet about the ability of a transient coalition to introduce such a novel concept through a simple commons motion and Act of Parliament.
This view is everywhere. A "noto55" campaign is steadily mustering momentum on Twitter. Jack Straw's performance on BBC4's Today program stoked the fires calling it a "fundamental alteration to our constitution", as you'd expect a Labour lawyer would. Carl Gardner, writing on his Head of Legal blog, describes it as "constitutional whimmery" which – if you're unfamiliar with the term – is not supposed to be complimentary.
On the other hand, I have spent much of the day talking to constitutional lawyers, like Vernon Bogdanor and Jeffrey Jowell. Their views were the complete opposite of the noto55 brigade. Which is not to say that they thought 55% was a good idea. Instead they said that changing the current rule is no different from changing anything else. The overriding legal principle is parliamentary sovereignty, which means parliament can do what it likes.
Parliamentary sovereignty though, is the real issue here. I'm often surprised that there is not more disquiet about the fact that parliament really can do what it likes. Usually the constraints on an all-powerful parliament are political, not legal, and rest on the fact that there are things no parliament could realistically do if it hoped to get re-elected one day. But we are in new coalition territory here. Who knows what future alignments might try to introduce to cling onto more fractious power?
And Richard Gordon QC – the only constitutional lawyer I spoke to today who shared sentiments of hostility to the proposals – pointed out that parliamentary sovereignty is essentially incompatible with the introduction of a written constitution.
Such a constitution, he points out, would necessarily entrench principles and protection regarded as permanent, like human rights and – if they were included – fixed-term parliaments. In the event of a written constitution these principles could not simply be amended by a simple majority in the Commons, something he describes as "the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty by a dominant executive".
The idea of a written constitution is something long-favoured by the Liberal Democrats; presumably in part to prevent rules like this being introduced on a whim.
As for whether the calls for a written constitution will survive the party's newfound political buddies, that remains to be seen. And in the meantime, the party will benefit from a fixed-term parliament with a 55% that is unconstitutional, or not – depending on who you ask.
